Root access on Linux is spread across sudo rules, SSH keys and service accounts. See where your estate stands.
The free Linux identity maturity assessment: twenty questions on the sudo rules, SSH keys, service accounts and access reviews behind who can do what on your Linux hosts. Answer for your estate as it is today and get a score out of 80, with the gaps that matter most and prioritised recommendations. They are also the controls NIS2, DORA and the CIS Benchmarks ask you to evidence. No form, no vendor pitch.
What you'll get
A score out of 80 across 5 Linux identity domains, structured feedback on areas of focus, and specific gaps with prioritised recommendations — no vendor pitch attached.
How to answer
Answer for your Linux environment as it is today, not as it's planned. There are no wrong answers. Honest answers give the most useful results.
What we cover
Identity inventory, privilege control, access governance, service accounts and other non-human identities (including the accounts AI agents run as), and compliance and audit readiness across Linux systems.
0 of 20 answered
The foundation of Linux identity security is knowing what exists. Orphaned accounts, undocumented service users and shared credentials can easily predate the current team.
How complete is your current inventory of human accounts with Linux access?
Orphaned accounts are the single most common critical finding across Linux environments.
How quickly could you produce a complete list of every account with local login access to a given Linux server?
Audit teams and incident responders ask this question on short notice.
Accounts lose their owner through leavers, ended contracts and retired services. How do you find Linux accounts with no current owner today?
Accounts with no known owner are a common privilege escalation entry point.
How well do you understand group membership across Linux systems — specifically which users are in security-sensitive groups (sudo, wheel, docker, etc.)?
Over-permissive group membership is often invisible. Many privilege escalation paths exist through groups, not individual account settings.
Privilege escalation through misconfigured sudo, NOPASSWD entries, and undocumented root accounts is the most exploited Linux attack vector.
How well do you know your current sudo configuration across all in-scope Linux systems?
Sudo rules tend to drift over time, and the drift is rarely monitored. NOPASSWD entries and overly broad sudoers rules are found in almost every environment that has not been actively managed.
How do you handle NOPASSWD sudo entries (commands or users that can escalate without a password)?
NOPASSWD entries are a known critical risk — they allow privilege escalation without authentication. They are often added for convenience and never reviewed.
How does your organisation enforce the principle of least privilege for human users on Linux systems?
Broad sudo access granted "temporarily" and never reviewed is one of the most common root causes of excessive privilege exposure.
Root access on a server is set in several places at once. How would you find out today which human users can run commands as root on a specific production server, without logging in to check?
Incident responders and auditors both ask this, often on short notice.
SSH keys that outlive the people who created them, group memberships that expand over time, and manual provisioning processes with no formal deprovisioning — these are governance issues more than technical ones, and they build up year on year.
What happens to Linux access when an employee or contractor leaves the organisation?
Offboarding that depends on an IT ticket being closed can leave Linux access in place. Access that outlives a leaver is a risk that grows with staff turnover.
How do you manage SSH authorised keys — specifically, do you know what keys exist, who they belong to, and which are still in use?
SSH keys work like long-lived passwords. Keys belonging to former staff, or of unknown origin, are a lasting risk that often goes unaudited.
Linux access is rarely covered by review tools built for the directory. How are access reviews (recertification) handled for your Linux systems today?
Access reviews are a requirement of ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIS2 and most major frameworks, and that requirement includes Linux systems.
How quickly does new Linux access get provisioned — and is there an approval workflow before it is granted?
Access granted without approval is hard to account for later, and makes access reviews harder to rely on. A consistent provisioning process makes governance easier to evidence.
Service accounts, automation users, and pipeline credentials are the fastest-growing and least-managed identity category on Linux. They often hold disproportionate privilege, are rarely rotated, and exist outside normal HR-linked identity lifecycle processes. AI agents authenticate as service accounts too, so their access sits in this domain.
Service accounts rarely link to HR records, so they sit outside normal joiner and leaver processes. How complete is your current inventory of service accounts and non-human identities (automation users, pipeline credentials, application accounts) with Linux access?
They are rarely linked to HR records, so they often sit outside normal joiner and leaver processes.
How do you manage the credentials (passwords, keys, tokens) used by service accounts on Linux systems?
Static, unrotated or shared service account credentials are a known target for attackers moving from one system to the next.
Service accounts tend to gain privilege over time. How are their privileges checked against what each one needs today?
Service accounts tend to gain privilege over time, and the impact is high: once compromised, an over-privileged service account is often the route into the wider environment.
Pipeline and integration access is usually set up once and left running. How do you track which CI/CD pipelines, automation tools and third-party integrations have SSH or sudo access today?
Pipeline credentials and automation access are often configured once and forgotten. That makes them a supply chain risk that is easy to overlook.
NIS2, DORA, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, and SOC 2 all require evidence of privileged access controls. Many teams can describe their controls but find it harder to produce exportable, audit-ready documentation on demand, which is what auditors look for.
If your auditor asked today for a report of all privileged Linux accounts and their access levels, how quickly could you produce it?
This is a common audit request under ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIS2, and PCI DSS.
Many teams run real controls but record them unevenly. What evidence of Linux access reviews, privilege certifications or entitlement audits could an auditor examine today?
Verbal descriptions of controls are not audit evidence. Auditors look for records they can examine: timestamps, reviewer names and access decisions.
How confident are you that your Linux identity controls meet the frameworks that apply to your environment?
NIS2 (Article 21), DORA, PCI DSS (Requirements 7 and 8), ISO 27001:2022 (A.5.15, A.8.2), and SOC 2 (CC6) all have specific identity and access management requirements that cover Linux systems.
When was the last time your Linux identity and access controls were independently reviewed — by an external party, red team, or internal audit?
Self-assessment is valuable but has limits. An independent review can find what internal checks miss, and carries weight that internal documentation alone cannot.