DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act) Compliance

DORA Article 9 Linux Identity Assessment

DORA Article 9 requires access controls. How does your Linux estate show up in your DORA evidence?

Years of vendor access, service accounts and sudo rules have built paths to root across the Linux systems behind your financial services. Those paths live on the host, outside what SIEM, EDR and cloud IAM were designed to inspect. Automation and AI agents now find and use them persistently, in the gaps between reviews. DORA has applied since January 2025, and Articles 8, 9, 10 and 28 ask for this evidence. Our pilot maps every path and delivers it.

Why Linux identity is a DORA question

  • Service accounts pile up in financial infrastructure. Accounts created for one-off integrations, vendor access or legacy systems keep collecting privilege, without the governance DORA’s access-control principles require.
  • Automation and AI agents authenticate as those service accounts. They inherit whatever reach the accounts have built up on core financial hosts, so an unmapped path to root is used persistently, in the gaps between review cycles. Demonstrating control under Article 9 means knowing what each account can do on each host, continuously.
  • Article 8 asks you to identify the ICT assets and roles behind your business functions, Article 9 to control access to them, and Article 10 to detect anomalous activity. Linux servers hosting core financial infrastructure fall within that scope.
  • DORA requires entities to produce audit evidence for their competent authority under DORA Article 46, demonstrating that ICT risk management controls are continuously effective, not just documented.

How the pilot maps to DORA

Every pilot finding is mapped to specific DORA controls, so the evidence feeds your DORA ICT risk management reporting.

Article / RequirementWhat it requiresHow the pilot covers it
Article 8Identification of ICT assets, roles and sources of ICT riskComplete Linux identity and privilege inventory with risk classification mapped to ICT risk management requirements
Article 9Protection and prevention measuresAssessment of access control configurations, privilege separation, and least-privilege implementation across your Linux estate
Article 10Detection of anomalous activitiesIdentification of privilege drift patterns and undocumented access changes that would evade standard detection mechanisms
Article 28 (Chapter V)ICT third-party risk managementAssessment of vendor and service account privileges identifying third-party access that exceeds authorised scope

The documents that define DORA access evidence in practice

Articles 8, 9 and 10 say what must be managed. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 and ENISA’s Technical Implementation Guidance say what the evidence looks like, and none of them is about servers. The last two are covered in our guide to Linux access control evidence under NIS2, DORA and the EU AI Act.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774

The regulatory technical standards on the ICT risk management framework, of 13 March 2024. Article 20 requires identity management that uniquely identifies the persons and systems accessing the entity’s information. Article 21 sets the access-control requirements built on it — need-to-know and least privilege, account lifecycle and authentication.

Read the source

Where the pilot’s evidence lands in the standards

  • RTS Art. 20

    Requirement
    Identity management — unique identification of persons and systems
    What the pilot hands over
    Shared accounts and keys reused across hosts flagged; logins, sudo commands and configuration changes attributed to the identity behind them.
  • RTS Art. 21

    Requirement
    Access control — need-to-know, least privilege, account lifecycle
    What the pilot hands over
    Every account, group, sudo rule and SSH key per host; which identities can reach root on which host, ranked by risk; dormant and orphaned accounts surfaced.
  • DORA Art. 8

    Requirement
    Identification of ICT assets, roles and sources of ICT risk
    What the pilot hands over
    The identity inventory per host, continuously updated, with the risk score of every remaining account explained inline.
  • DORA Art. 10

    Requirement
    Detection of anomalous activities
    What the pilot hands over
    Sudo, SSH and PAM configuration tracked against an approved baseline; changes detected in near-real-time and attributed, recorded in a chain-hashed audit log.
  • DORA Art. 28

    Requirement
    ICT third-party risk
    What the pilot hands over
    Every vendor and service account listed with what it can do; access that exceeds its authorised scope flagged.

Where LinuxGuard sits among the Linux compliance tools you already run

Most estates in scope already run Lynis, OpenSCAP, auditd or Ubuntu Pro for hardening and logging. Each closes part of the picture. None was designed to answer who can reach root on which host, or to keep that answer current. Read them as complements, which is how we deploy alongside them. Our NIS2 page sets out what each one closes and leaves open.

What you get

  • Identity & Privilege Inventory — Every user, group, sudo rule, SSH key, and service account across your Linux estate, showing who can do what
  • Risk-Scored Findings Report — Prioritised findings based on real exploit patterns, highlighting the privilege paths attackers would use first
  • Compliance Evidence Package — Identity governance gaps mapped to DORA Articles 8, 9 and 10 and to the Chapter V third-party risk provisions, with remediation guidance
  • Prioritised Remediation Plan — Phased plan to reduce privilege drift and move toward least-privilege, ordered by the paths to root each change closes
  • Board-Ready Executive Summary — Executive summary for boards and a technical deep-dive for your security team

How the Founding Pilot Works

The Founding Pilot runs in five phases over 60 days. It starts with discovery and scoping, then maps identity and privilege with lightweight, read-only collectors. A security and compliance assessment maps the findings to DORA Articles 8, 9, 10 and 28. Reporting closes it, with a prioritised least-privilege remediation roadmap. A dedicated Linux identity specialist supports the pilot throughout. Collection is read-only. Only a response action alters a host: one someone has approved or, once an administrator has switched on active response, one that runs in real time. See the Founding Pilot for the full five-phase process, timeline, and deliverables.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does DORA apply to our Linux infrastructure?
Yes. DORA applies to the ICT systems supporting your financial services operations, regardless of operating system. Linux servers running core banking, payment processing, trading, and settlement infrastructure are within DORA scope. Article 8 requires you to identify and document those assets and the roles attached to them; Article 9 requires access to them to be limited and governed.
What does Article 8 require for ICT risk management on Linux systems?
Article 8 requires financial entities to identify, classify and document the ICT assets supporting their business functions and the roles attached to them, and to keep those inventories current. Article 9 requires access to those assets to be limited to what approved functions actually need. For Linux systems, this means being able to demonstrate who has access to which systems, under what sudo rules, with which SSH keys — and that this access is reviewed, governed, and limited to business necessity.
How does the pilot fit into ICT third-party risk assessment under Chapter V?
The pilot inventories all service accounts and vendor access configurations on your Linux estate, identifying third-party privileges that exceed the scope of authorised access agreements. This output feeds directly into your third-party ICT risk register and supports the contractual oversight requirements DORA places on material ICT service providers in Chapter V.
What evidence does the pilot produce for supervisory authorities?
The pilot delivers a structured DORA compliance evidence pack with findings mapped to specific Articles (8, 9, 10 and 28). Each finding includes the current state, the compliance gap, and the remediation pathway. The evidence pack is structured for review by your competent authority under DORA Article 46.
Can the pilot be scoped to DORA-critical systems only?
Yes. We can focus the pilot on systems directly supporting your DORA-critical ICT services — core banking, payment infrastructure, trading systems, or settlement platforms. At kickoff we agree the scope boundary with your team. We prioritise the systems classified as material ICT assets in your DORA risk register, and those supervisory authorities are most likely to scrutinise. For how that scope looks in a payments or banking environment, see Linux identity on payments estates.

Ready to evidence DORA on your Linux estate?

Start the pilot on the Linux systems supporting your financial services: every path to root mapped, and the ICT risk management evidence for Articles 8, 9, 10 and 28 produced from the same map.